|
The Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October – 11 November 1942) took place near the Egyptian railway halt of El Alamein. With the Allies victorious, it marked a major turning point in the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War. It followed the First Battle of El Alamein, which had stalled the Axis advance into Egypt, after which, in August 1942, Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery had taken command of the British Eighth Army from General Claude Auchinleck. This victory turned the tide in the North African Campaign and ended the Axis threat to Egypt, the Suez Canal, and of gaining access to the Middle Eastern and Persian oil fields via North Africa. From a psychological perspective, Second El Alamein revived the morale of the Allies, being the first major offensive against the Axis since the start of the European war in 1939 in which the Western Allies had achieved a decisive victory. The battle coincided with the Allied invasion of French North Africa in Operation Torch, which started 8 November. ==Background== By 12 July 1942, after its success at the Battle of Gazala, the Panzer Army Africa (''Panzerarmee Afrika''), composed of German and Italian infantry and mechanised units under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, had struck deep into Egypt, threatening the British Empire's control of the Suez Canal and Palestine. General Auchinleck withdrew the Eighth Army to within of Alexandria to a point where the Qattara Depression came to within of El Alamein on the coast. This gave the defenders a relatively short front to defend and provided secure flanks, because tanks could not traverse the Depression. Here, in early July, the Axis advance was halted in the First Battle of El Alamein. The Eighth Army counter-offensives during July were unsuccessful, as Rommel dug in to allow his exhausted troops to regroup. At the end of July, Auchinleck called off all offensive action with a view to rebuilding the army’s strength. In early August, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke—the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff—visited Cairo and replaced Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief Middle East with General Sir Harold Alexander. Lieutenant-General William Gott was to command the Eighth Army, but was killed before taking command when the transport plane he was travelling in was shot down by Luftwaffe fighters; Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery became Eighth Army commander. Faced with overextended supply lines and a relative lack of reinforcements, and well aware of massive allied reinforcements in men and material on the way, Rommel decided to strike the Allies while their build-up was incomplete. The two armoured divisions of the ''Afrika Korps'', together with a force made up of the reconnaissance units of ''Panzer'' Army Africa, spearheaded the attack; but, on 30 August 1942, the Allies stopped them at Alam el Halfa ridge and Point 102. The attack failed in this second battle at the Alamein line, better known as the Battle of Alam el Halfa (commonly, but incorrectly, Alam Halfa); expecting a counter-attack by Montgomery's Eighth Army, ''Panzer'' Army Africa dug in. The factors that had favoured the Eighth Army's defensive plan in the First Battle of El Alamein, the short front line and the secure flanks, now favoured the Axis on defence.〔Bierman & Smith (2002), p.255〕 Rommel, furthermore, had plenty of time to prepare his defensive positions and lay extensive minefields (approximately 500,000 mines)〔 and barbed wire. Alexander and Montgomery were determined to establish a superiority of forces sufficient not only to achieve a breakthrough but also to exploit it and destroy ''Panzer'' Army Africa. In all the previous swings of the pendulum in the Western Desert since 1941, neither side had ever had the strength after achieving victory in an offensive battle to exploit it decisively: the losing side had always been able to withdraw and regroup closer to its main supply bases. Against this, the British had established an intelligence advantage. Signals intelligence (both Ultra and local sources) provided a clear picture of the Axis order of battle, its supply position and force disposition and intentions. A reorganisation of the intelligence function in Africa in July had also improved the integration of intelligence received from all sources and the speed of its dissemination.〔Hinsley, p. 425〕 Furthermore, almost without exception, intelligence identified in good time the supply ships destined for North Africa, their location or routing and in most cases their cargoes, allowing targets to be prioritised, reconnoitred and attacked.〔Hinsley, p. 423〕 By 25 October, ''Panzer'' Army fuel stocks were down to three day's supply, of which only two days were east of Tobruk. As a consequence, ''Panzer'' Army "... did not possess the operational freedom of movement that was absolutely essential in consideration of the fact that the British offensive can be expected to start any day".〔Hinsley, p. 427〕 Submarine and air transport, however, somewhat eased the shortage of ammunition and, by late October, stocks amounted to 16 days supply in forward areas.〔 After six more weeks of building up its forces, the Eighth Army was ready to strike. 195,000 men and 1,029 tanks under Montgomery made their move against the 116,000 men and 547 tanks of ''Panzer'' Army Africa. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Second Battle of El Alamein」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|